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DISRAELI AND THE EASTERN QUESTION: 
DEFENDING BRITISH INTERESTS 
By Caroline A. Reed 
The Eastern Question concerned Europe for the better part of 500 
years, but it reached crisis points several times during the 19th century.  The 
deterioration of Turkey, the creeping advance of Russia into the Balkans and 
Central Asia, and the creation of an alliance between Russia, Germany, and 
Austria-Hungary were all issues contained in the Eastern Question of the 
1870s.  All three of these issues threatened Britain’s goals of securing India 
and maintaining a balance of power between the major powers on the 
European continent.  Therefore, in dealing with the Eastern Question, Prime 
Minister Benjamin Disraeli pursued a course that kept Russia out of India and 
reasserted British power relative to the rest of the European Continent. 
An understanding of events in the 1870s requires knowledge of the 
Eastern Question. According to historian J. A. R. Marriott, there were six 
main underlying factors involved in the Eastern Question.1  The principal 
issue was the effect of the Ottoman Empire’s deterioration on the major 
European powers.  The second major issue was the boundaries and ethnic 
makeup of the Balkan states like Serbia and Bulgaria located within the 
Ottoman Empire.  A portion of the Ottoman Empire was located in Europe, 
which meant that many of the people in the Balkans were Christians and 
therefore persecuted by the Ottoman Muslims.2  Third, control of the Black 
Sea, particularly the Dardanelles and Constantinople, often caused conflict 
between the Russians, Austro-Hungarians, and Ottomans.  The Ottomans 
continued to control Constantinople, which benefitted Britain since the 
Ottoman territory provided a buffer between Russia and India.  Russia and 
Austria-Hungary posed another problem for the powers, for both countries 
wanted access to the sea.  Russians and Austro-Hungarians also had ties to 
different Balkan states that were both religious and ethnic in nature.3  The 
Russian government, in particular, had to consider its subjects’ panslavism 
and sympathy for the Orthodox Christians.4  Marriott says that the sixth factor 
1 J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European 
Diplomacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 2-3. 
2 Robert Blake, Disraeli (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), 576. 
3 Marriott, 3. 
4 Blake, 576. 
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is “the attitude of the European powers in general, and of England in 
particular, towards all or any of the questions enumerated above.”5 
Towards the end of the 19th century, the makeup of the European 
continent began to change.  The Franco-Prussian War left France weak while 
Germany experienced a surge in power after finally unifying in 1871.  
Beginning in 1870, the leaders of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary 
made a series of state visits to each other’s countries to confirm their similar 
foreign policy positions and a collective need to follow the same policies.  
This unofficial alliance, called the dreikaiserbund (“three emperor bond”), 
represented a return to the alliance systems in Europe.6  The dreikaiserbund 
concentrated power on the continent in those three countries, leaving France, 
Italy, and Britain without allies to counter them.  On the British side, Disraeli 
returned to the office of Prime Minister in 1874 intent on reasserting Britain’s 
dominance on the European stage.  Disraeli accused William Gladstone and 
his Liberal government of being inactive and isolationist because of 
Gladstone’s “failure to mediate in the Franco-Prussian war, [or] to prevent 
the Russian denunciation of the Black Sea clauses.”7  One of Disraeli’s 
biographers, Georg Brandes, went so far as to say that these supposed 
blunders “made England an object of ridicule to every European state.”8  
Disraeli considered foreign policy to be “the most important and fascinating 
task of the statesman,” so he resolved to pursue a more aggressive, pro-
empire course.9  In Disraeli’s own words, “what our duty is at this critical 
moment is to maintain the Empire of England.”10 
Britain also had to keep events in Central Asia in mind.  Any threat 
to India could not be ignored because it was the centerpiece of the British 
Empire.  While most countries were afraid of an invasion on home soil, 
Britain instead worried about an invasion in India.
11
  To the British statesmen 
                                                             
5 Marriott, 3. 
6 Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914 
(Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), 159. 
7 Blake, 571. 
8 Georg Brandes, Lord Beaconsfield: A Study (NY: Thomas Y. Crowell 
Company, 1966), 222. 
9 Blake, 570. 
10 Benjamin Disraeli, “The Maintenance of Empire, 1872,” 
http://www.ccis.edu/faculty/dskarr/Discussions%20and%20Readings/primary%0sourc
es/Disraeli,%20speech%201872.htm (accessed November 23, 2015). 
11 Sneh Mahajan, British Foreign Policy 1874-1914: The Role of India 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 1-2. 
Disraeli and the Eastern Question 
19 
of the 1870s, Russia was the biggest threat because of its expanding territory, 
economy, and population.  Russia’s expansion into Afghanistan threatened 
the northwest frontier of India.12  During the 1800s, Russia had steadily 
advanced her territory in the Far East and Central Asia.  China and 
“disunited, semi-barbarous states” in the Middle East did not put up much of 
a fight so it had been fairly easy for the Russians to expand as far south as 
Afghanistan.13  Neither Russia nor Britain controlled Afghanistan officially, 
but this mountainous region separated Russian forces from India.  However, 
Britain was more afraid of Russian influence rather than an actual physical 
attack.  The British feared that it would be very easy for Russia to incite an 
insurrection among the Indian troops.14  In fact, by 1870 the Russian generals 
located in Central Asia began ingratiating themselves with the Amir of 
Afghanistan.  The British followed suit and so the Amir felt caught between 
the two countries.  Gladstone’s Liberal government, however, refused to 
promise military aid to the Amir in the case of a Russian attack and so by the 
time Disraeli came to power, the Amir was leaning more towards the 
Russians.15   
  
                                                             
12 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 
1850-1995, 3rd ed. (London: Pearson Education, 1996), 84-85. 
13 Jelavich, 161. 
14 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia 
(NY: Kodansha International, 1994), 359. 
15 Willliam Flavelle Monypenny and George Earle Buckle, The Life of 
Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, vol. 2 (NY: The Macmillan Company, 
1929), 748-749. 
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In reality, Russia did not have the ability to finance development in 
its outer fringes such as Afghanistan.  Therefore, events in Afghanistan did 
not matter to Russia to the extent that they mattered to Britain.16  The Russian 
government made repeated promises not to advance farther or threaten 
India.17  However, Russian generals in Central Asia often made territorial 
advances that were not sanctioned by the government, which undermined 
their promises.  St. Petersburg’s lack of apparent control over their generals 
made Britain and Disraeli nervous.18  The Russian threat in Central Asia, 
combined with the age-old worry of Russia’s quest for Constantinople, a 
worry made more tangible by the Balkan Crisis, affected the way Disraeli 
handled the coming crises of the Eastern Question. 
Beginning in 1875, it became apparent that the Eastern Question was 
causing another crisis when several revolts broke out in Bosnia and spread 
quickly to Herzegovina and Serbia.  The uprising broke out for several 
reasons, all of which pointed to weakness and gross mismanagement on the 
part of the Ottoman government.  The Ottomans had an unsound economic 
structure that worsened by heavy borrowing and heavy spending.  In addition, 
there was a drought and famine in Asia Minor from 1873-1874 and a 
financial panic in Constantinople in 1873.19  These events only made existing 
conditions worse for the Christian peasants in the European provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire.  The Christians paid heavy taxes to both landowners and 
tax farmers and were often exploited for more money.20  There was little 
opportunity for justice for these peasants, so they opted for rebellion.21  This 
uprising gave Disraeli his first opportunity to pursue the more active foreign 
policy he believed was necessary to maintain Britain’s power and importance 
on the European Continent.  Therefore, as the Balkan Crisis developed, 
Disraeli sought a response that was solely Britain’s rather than one dependent 
on the major powers.22 
The first formal reaction by any of the major European powers to the 
Balkan Crisis was the Andrassy Note.  Count Andrassy, the Foreign Minister 
16 Jelavich, 171. 
17 R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question: A 
Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1962) 4-6. 
18 Jelavich, 170-171. 
19 Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (NY: Rinehart, 1958), 
390. 
20 Stavrianos, 397. 
21 Seton-Watson, 17. 
22 Blake, 580. 
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for Austria-Hungary, Prince Gorchakov, the Chancellor of Russia, and Prince 
Bismarck of Germany formulated a reform program for the Ottomans in an 
effort to appease the rebelling Balkan states.  This committee of foreign 
ministers sent out the so-called Andrassy Note on December 30, 1875 to the 
major European powers.  The reforms called for the “abolition of tax farming, 
agrarian improvements, a guarantee that provincial revenues should be spent 
on provincial needs,” religious freedom for Christians in the Balkan states, 
and a joint Muslim and Christian commission to oversee enforcement of all 
the reforms.23  The dreikaiserbund hoped that the Andrassy Note would 
produce true reforms in the Ottoman Empire.  The Ottomans usually did not 
implement the reforms that European powers imposed on them, but the 
method the Andrassy Note laid out had potential for true reform.24  Russia, 
Germany, Italy, and France quickly accepted the Andrassy Note.  Britain, or 
rather Disraeli, hesitated.  He wanted Britain’s course to be set by the British 
and the British alone.  Disraeli did not appreciate being left out of the 
discussion of terms for the Ottomans by the dreikaiserbund.25  Now he either 
had to simply follow the other powers or do nothing.  Disraeli reluctantly 
accepted the terms, but it did not matter anyway because the Andrassy Note 
failed.  Though the European powers and the Turks accepted it, the rebels in 
the Balkan states did not, as they did not see the reforms actually being 
achieved unless the European powers put real force behind it.26  
Meanwhile, Disraeli made a couple of political moves that 
strengthened Britain’s hold over India and showed the rest of Europe that 
India was fully Britain’s territory.  One of Disraeli’s biographers, Clive 
Bigham, calls both of these actions “personal strokes” for Disraeli.27  These 
are two of the events he is most remembered for in his whole political career.  
The first of these moves was the purchase of shares in the Suez Canal.  
Although far from carrying the majority of Britain's overall trade, the Suez 
Canal was extremely important commercially and strategically for Britain.  
4/5 or 80 percent of the trade through the Canal itself was British.  The Suez 
Canal cut the route from Britain to India down by several weeks and nearly 
                                                             
23 Stavrianos, 400. 
24 “Count Andrassy’s Note,” John Bull 2,876 (January 22, 1876), 56. 
25 Marvin Swartz, The Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of 
Disraeli and Gladstone (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 55. 
26 Stavrianos, 400. 
27 Hon. Clive Bigham, The Prime Ministers of Britain 1721-1921 (London: 
John Murray, 1922), 294. 
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6,000 miles.  For Britain, this was important should there be more Indian 
insurrections or Russia threatened their interests in India or the Far East.  
Because of this, Disraeli moved toward involvement in the Canal Company 
before he became Prime Minister.  However, the Suez Canal Company was 
French owned.28  He tried to buy out the owner, Ferdinand de Lesseps, soon 
into his term as Prime Minister in order to control the company but nothing 
came of it. De Lesseps was not willing to sell despite the fact that the 
company was running at a loss.29  Disraeli continued to look for a way to 
involve Britain in the Canal.  The Canal was too important for Britain’s trade 
and defense of India to not have a solid and defendable financial interest in it. 
In 1875, Egypt’s precarious financial situation was pushing the 
government very close to bankruptcy.30  The Khedive of Egypt, Isma’il 
Pasha, had been spending an increasing amount of money until he could not 
pay the debt of three to four million pounds that he owed in 1875. Virtually, 
the only option he had left to raise the money was to sell his 144,000 shares.  
The Khedive began secret negotiations with two different French companies 
in attempt to sell his shares.  Henry Oppenheim, a financier who was greatly 
interested in Egypt, knew of the negotiations.  He then told Frederick 
Greenwood, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, and Greenwood let the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Derby, know of the 
development.31 Disraeli wanted to act quickly because of Egypt's precarious 
financial situation, as well as the interest show by French companies in 
buying the share.  Both the Cabinet and the Khedive were reluctant.32  The 
French companies tried to raise the money in time but could not and the 
French government refused to intervene even after de Lesseps requested it.33  
The Khedive eventually decided that it did not make sense for him to sell to a 
French company because it was less profitable for him.
34
  He informed the 
British government that he was ready to sell the shares. Disraeli felt he 
needed to act quickly so the Khedive did not change his mind.  Parliament 
was not sitting at the time of the negotiations so Disraeli had to procure the 
money through a loan.  Disraeli was a friend with the Rothschilds, a wealthy 
                                                             
28 Blake, 581. 
29 Ibid., 582. 
30 Porter, 90-91. 
31 Monypenny and Buckle, 779. 
32 Seton-Watson, 26-27. 
33 Blake, 582. 
34 Seton-Watson, 26-27. 
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British family that was involved in banking, and so requested that their firm 
put up the four million pounds.  They agreed immediately and the transaction 
was secured.35   
On November 24, 1875, the Queen wrote in her journal that the 
purchase gave Britain “complete security for India, and altogether places us 
in a very safe position.”36  The Times claimed that now Britain finally had 
stock in Egypt.  This was somewhat of an overstatement, but it highlighted 
the importance of the purchase because it gave Britain something tangible in 
Egypt.37  Many European countries recognized the purchase as a masterful 
stroke for British foreign policy.  In fact, nearly every European country aside 
from Russia congratulated the British government on the purchase.38  In a 
debate over the shares purchase in Parliament, Lord George Hamilton said, 
“The purchase told the world that if in the past we had ignored the advantages 
of the Canal, we had amply condoned our error, and by this judicious 
investment…we had formed a happy combination which would do much 
towards securing a free and uninterrupted water way between this country 
and India.”39  Though Disraeli did not know it at the time, the purchase he 
directed led Britain’s increasing influence in the Suez and in Egypt over the 
next decade.40  For the time being, major powers recognized that the Suez 
was an extra layer of security for British interests in India, as well as the Suez 
Canal itself. 
In 1876, Disraeli made the second political move that gave Britain a 
greater hold over India.  Early in that year, Queen Victoria began pressuring 
Disraeli to introduce a bill to create the title, Empress of India, a phrase 
already used colloquially.  The timing was inconvenient for Disraeli, but his 
Queen placed immense pressure on him.41  Though he was reluctant to use 
his political capital to pass the bill, the conferment of the title agreed with 
                                                             
35 Blake, 583. 
36 “Queen Victoria to Mr. Theodoe Martin, Windsor Castle, Nov. 26, 1875,” 
The Letters of Queen Victoria, Second Series: A Selection from Her Majesty’s 
Correspondence and Journal between the Years 1862 and 1878, vol. 2, ed. George 
Earle Buckle (London: John Murray, 1926), 428. 
37 Porter, 90-91. 
38 Monypenny and Buckle, 791. 
39 Hansard Parliamentary Debates. “Resolution. Adjourned Debate,” HC 
Debate, 21 February 1876, v. 227: col. 636. http://hansard.millibanksystems.com 
40 Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (NY: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1972), 253. 
41 E. J. Feuchtwanger, Disraeli (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
177. 
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everything Disraeli believed and expressed about imperialism and the 
importance of capturing the imagination of India.42  The timing of it also 
lined up with the Prince of Wales’ recent trip to India. Within the context of 
growing fears of Russian advance in Central Asia, Queen Victoria was more 
sensitive to the fact that Tsar Alexander II was an Emperor and she was not.43  
The leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary also held Imperial titles.  
Furthermore, the Queen’s daughter was soon to have an Imperial title and the 
Queen, understandably, would not have appreciated her daughter outranking 
her.44  Therefore, creating the title of Empress for her was an attempt to 
reassert British power and authority.45  The Queen recognized that the 
Empress title reflected the status the she had over India since the Indian 
Mutiny, and sent a message to the world, namely Russia, that India was off 
limits.46 
There were several objections to the Bill in both Houses.  One 
objection was that the title would only apply to India.  The case was made for 
the title to encompass all of the colonies with the Princes becoming the 
Princes of Australia and Canada. However, this idea was quickly dropped 
because there was a greater difference in relationship between Great Britain 
and India than between her other colonies.  The Empress title was incredibly 
helpful for Britain’s presence in India.47  Many British subjects also worried 
about forsaking the ancient royal title in favor of an imperial title.  It seemed 
un-English in many ways.48  Other monarchs had imperial titles, but English 
monarchs did not.  The Queen dispelled all these fears in a letter to Disraeli 
on March 18 in which she said that she did not have the “slightest intention of 
giving the title of Imperial Highness to any of her children, or of making any 
change in the name of the Sovereign of Great Britain.”49  Disraeli explained 
these intentions repeatedly to Parliament.  The Queen would remain Queen 
first and foremost and be Empress only in India.50  The Royal Titles Act 
42 Feuchtwanger, 177. 
43 Blake, 562. 
44 Feuchtwanger, 177. 
45 Blake, 562. 
46 Elizabeth Longford, Queen Victoria: Born to Succeed (NY: Harper & 
Row, 1965), 404. 
47 Monypenny and Buckle, 806. 
48 Feuchtwanger, 178. 
49 “From Queen Victoria, Windsor Castle, March 11, 1876,” Monypenny 
and Buckle, 809. 
50 Monypenny and Buckle, 811. 
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finally passed at the end of year, giving the Queen the title of Empress of 
India on the end of her name.  There were celebrations around India for a full 
two weeks leading up to the proclamation on the first of January, 1877.  
Before the actual proclamation, Lord Lytton, the Viceroy in India, decorated 
Indian chiefs with honors, increased the salaries of the chiefs and their army, 
distributed food and clothing to the poor, and granted amnesty to prisoners.  
Disraeli hoped that the Empress title would impress upon the Indian people 
the strength of the Queen and counteract rumors about Russia extending their 
authority.51  In a letter to Lady Bradford on December 28, 1876, Disraeli said 
of the celebrations of Empress, “it has no doubt consolidated our empire 
there.”52 
While Disraeli focused on the Royal Titles Bill at home, Serbia, 
Bosnia, and Herzegovina continued to rebel against the Ottoman government.  
At the end of May 1876, two events occurred at the same time.  When the 
Balkan crisis worsened in May, the dreikaiserbund made an attempt at 
another reform program like the Andrassy Note.  Prince Bismarck, 
Gorchakov, and Count Andrassy gathered once again to create terms for a 
two-month armistice between the different sides in the uprising.53  The Berlin 
Memorandum, as it was called, basically extended the Andrassy Note.  The 
Christians could keep their arms initially while the consuls from the various 
powers oversaw the settlement of refugees and the implementation of reforms 
for the Balkan states. They recognized that continued trouble in the Balkan 
states was an easy way to break up their alliance.54  Though Bismarck, 
Andrassy, and Gorchakov drew up the actual document, they did consult the 
British, French, and Italian ambassadors to Germany before finalizing it.  All 
of the ambassadors, including Britain’s Lord Odo Russell, agreed to the terms 
and expected their governments to react favorably to the memorandum.
55
  
However, Disraeli completely rejected the Memorandum.  He did not like the 
reforms it proposed or the fact that it was created among the dreikaiserbund 
without British input.56  At this point, Disraeli felt that Britain’s rejection of 
the Memorandum was the correct step in the imperial course he was taking.  
                                                             
51 Seton-Watson, 6-7. 
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Britain no longer appeared to be isolationist because she was making her own 
decisions rather than accepting it like all of the other powers.  Britain also did 
not have to intervene to be interventionist or commit to either Turkey or the 
Balkan states.  Furthermore, in his calculations, pushback from Britain 
equaled uneasiness and weakness in the dreikaiserbund alliance.57  He did not 
succeed in weakening the alliance at this point, but he certainly made an 
impression on the other powers.  Disraeli’s biographer, Edgar Feuchtwanger, 
called the rejection of the Memorandum Disraeli’s “most high-profile 
initiative” of that year.58 
Immediate events justified Disraeli’s rejection of the Berlin 
Memorandum.  On May 30, 1876, the same day the dreikaiserbund issued a 
Memorandum, a palace coup took place in Constantinople.  Murad V 
replaced Abdul Aziz as Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.  Soon after, in June, 
both the Ottoman Foreign Affairs and War Ministers died at the hands of one 
of the council chamber guards.59  All the powers realized they created the 
Berlin Memorandum in vain.  They had to give the new Sultan time to set up 
his government before they could possibly impose any reforms.60   The new 
Sultan promised reforms that would hopefully treat the Christians and Balkan 
peoples better.  Instead, Britain’s rejection of the Memorandum only 
emboldened the Ottomans against adhering to any reforms.  The message the 
Turks received was that Britain’s interest in preserving the Ottoman Empire 
came first before any genuine desire for the Turks to reform.61 
Serbia declared war on the Ottomans in the early summer of 1876.  
At first the declaration of war did not produce much more debate among the 
powers.  The declaration was essentially a formal statement of existing 
circumstances.  However, later in the summer, reports began to surface that 
the Turks had committed atrocities against the Christians in Bulgaria, such as 
arson, sodomy, rape, and torture.  Soon, Britain was in an uproar over the 
Bulgarian atrocities.  Disraeli did not fully trust the horror stories, 
particularly, the initial reports.62  In fact, it was difficult to tell what was 
actually happening with the Turkish Christians.  On the one hand, William 
Richard Holmes, the British consul at Sarajevo, kept insisting that it really 
                                                             
57 Seton-Watson, 38-39. 
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59 Seton-Watson, 35-37. 
60 Blake, 588-589. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Blake, 592. 
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was not as terrible as it seemed.  He also insisted that the Christians were not 
vying for autonomy, but rather that they be treated justly under Turkish rule.  
However, many news correspondents, travel journal authors, and relief 
workers located in Bulgaria claimed otherwise and corroborated the story that 
the Christians were being persecuted and wanted autonomy.63  Unfortunately, 
Disraeli made some distasteful comments, dismissing the atrocities as nothing 
more than “coffee-house babble.”64  Gladstone even came out of retirement to 
speak against Disraeli on this issue and to champion the Bulgarian Christians’ 
cause.65  Disraeli obstinately refused to “respond to the scare-mongering” of 
the Liberals.66  He was not pro-Turk or opposed to autonomy, but he did not 
see the benefit of an “emotional hostility to the Turks.”67  He cared more 
about the fate of the Balkans, the impact on Turkey, and the relationship 
between Russia and Britain rather than what it meant for the Christians.68   
By the fall of 1876, the Ottomans routed the Serbian army and only 
fought a few skirmishes.  The real battle was about to begin, because the 
conflict did not affect only Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, it affected nearly 
all of the major European powers.  Therefore, they all had opinions about the 
armistice.  On the Russian side, the war between the Serbs and the Ottomans 
inspired a resurgence of Russian Panslavism and sympathy for Orthodox 
Christians in the Balkans.69  Panslavism was a broad term that encompassed 
people with many different types of programs, from the Moscow Slavic 
Benevolent Society to the Slavic Ethnographical Exhibition.  However, all 
Panslavs sought Russian leadership of their Slavic brothers and sisters in the 
Balkans.  They wanted the Balkan provinces to be liberated from the 
Ottomans and claimed by Russia instead.70  Tsar Alexander II did not 
condone the uprising or Panslavism, but enough of the Russian consuls 
located in the Balkan provinces were actually Panslavic that they 
misrepresented Russia’s goals.71  Disraeli’s biographer, Robert Blake, wrote 
that General Ignatyev, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, “frankly 
aimed at the overthrow of Turkish power in the Balkans and at Russian 
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seizure of the Straits.”72  Panslavism threatened other European powers like 
Austria-Hungary and Britain.  Disraeli tended to only see the radical Panslav 
side, which clouded his view of Russian designs.73  However, it was not 
Disraeli’s fault that he felt threatened by the Russian government’s perceived 
Panslavism.  From the outside, it was reasonable to assume that Russia would 
be sympathetic to the Serbian cause.  The Panslav influence seemed 
overwhelming, and in many ways it was.  Panslavism often influenced the 
Tsar when he was surrounded by it, like at Livadia.  When more clear-headed 
ministers surrounded him in St. Petersburg, he was pacifist.74   
On the British side, Disraeli continued the traditional policy of 
maintaining the Ottoman Empire.  Russia’s advances on the Ottoman Empire 
threatened Britain’s interests in India in a roundabout way.  Britain needed to 
be able to communicate with and travel to India.  Their best options were to 
go overland through the Mediterranean or through the new Suez Canal.  
Russian movement into Ottoman territory threatened British access to both of 
those routes.75  The Bulgarian atrocities and the resurgence of Panslavism 
heightened the tension between Russia and the Ottomans.  This made Disraeli 
nervous because a war between the two countries seemed imminent.  He 
needed to make sure Russia knew Britain would intervene if their interests 
were threatened.76  Disraeli still considered the protection of the Ottoman 
Empire against Russia to be the most important way to protect India.77 
Between the fall of 1876 and the spring of 1877, a myriad of 
armistice options, negotiations, and ultimatums passed between the Ottomans 
and the major European powers.  Overarching all the negotiations were the 
opposing forces of panslavism in Russia and the need to protect Turkey on 
the British side.  Essentially the Turks refused everything either power 
suggested.  Russia and Britain continually made proposals, however, because 
the Ottomans’ own terms were completely unacceptable.  They wanted the 
Serbian prince to pay homage to the Sultan and increase taxes on the 
Serbians.78  Russia could not agree to such terms because of the consequences 
72 Blake, 610. 
73 Seton-Watson, 20. 
74 Blake, 609. 
75 Porter, 85-86. 
76 Blake, 608. 
77 Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish 
Empire (NY: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1977), 519. 
78 Seton-Watson, 95-96. 
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for the Serbian Christians.  Britain could not agree to the terms because 
Russia would not agree to them, and, if Russia was unsatisfied with the 
settlement of the war, they would declare war on the Ottomans.  Of course, 
the Serbians would never accept the Ottomans’ terms either.  In September of 
1876, Britain’s Lord Derby proposed maintaining the status quo of Bosnian 
and Montenegrin territories and called for the autonomy of Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, and Bulgaria with the transition to be overseen by the powers.79  
All of the powers agreed to Lord Derby’s suggestions, except the Ottomans.  
They countered the proposal by suggesting a long armistice with a general 
reform program for the Balkans that none of the other powers believed would 
occur.  Most of the powers, including Britain, agreed but both Russia and 
Germany hesitated.80  Britain might be able to pretend that the Ottomans 
would carry out the reforms, but the Russian government could not ignore the 
outcry from the Russian public to defend the Christians.   
Lord Derby then proposed that the powers meet for a conference in 
Constantinople.  Everyone agreed, and the Constantinople Conference began 
on December 12, 1876.  Lord Salisbury went as Britain’s representative, 
which pleased Disraeli because the two men had similar, if not identical, 
ideas about the whole situation.  Unlike Lord Derby, Lord Salisbury had a 
healthy suspicion of the Russians, and he never let an olive branch from them 
go to waste.  However, he was unlike Disraeli in that he was determined to 
get the Balkan Christians out from under the Ottomans as soon as possible.81  
Lord Salisbury was a perfect mix between the opposing sides of Lord Derby 
and Disraeli.   
The Conference was to settle three main things: peace terms 
between the Ottomans and Serbs, autonomy of Bosnia and Bulgaria, and the 
logistics of international oversight of the terms.
82
  The objective was to settle 
the Balkan territorial issues and Ottomans’ reform issues rather than make 
sure that any of the powers got anything tangible out of the terms.83  
However, the Conference was doomed to fail from the beginning.  As soon as 
it started, the Ottomans announced a new Grand Vizier and a new 
constitution that promised new reforms and a better system.  In reality, they 
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were simply stalling and trying to disrupt the Conference, because they did 
not want it to take place.84  As usual, the Ottomans fooled none of the powers 
into thinking that they were sincere.  However, there was not much the 
delegates could do if the Ottoman’s Constitution was promising all of the 
reforms that the Conference proposed.  So the Conference ended in January 
of 1877, almost as soon as it started.  The Ottomans and Serbs finally made 
peace but only based on the status quo rather than any territorial changes or 
promised reforms.85 
Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in April 1877.  All of 
the major European powers expected Russia to win and to eventually occupy 
Constantinople.  Apparently, the tension and worry led Disraeli to threaten 
resignation and the Queen to threaten abdication.86  The closer Russia got to 
Constantinople, the more nervous the British became.  Disraeli was afraid 
that the Russians would reach Constantinople faster than the British fleet 
could be sent through the Dardanelles, so he suggested occupying Gallipoli.  
The Cabinet rejected his suggestion and instead settled on sending a note to 
Russia warning them not to go near Constantinople, the Straits, the Suez 
Canal, or Egypt.87   
The Ottomans effectively halted the Russians at a Bulgarian town 
called Plevna in July 1877 and held them back longer than anyone expected.  
This delay for the Russians gave Disraeli and his cabinet more time to 
formulate a response and contingency plan in case Russia did occupy 
Constantinople.  Though the British threatened Russia numerous times with 
intervention if the Russians advanced further, Disraeli was not confident that 
they would not touch Constantinople.  In October 1877, Disraeli’s cabinet 
met to come up with plans in case Russia did advance towards the 
Bosporus.
88
  Disraeli had military plans ready for a long time before anything 
between Russia and the Ottomans broke out.  Most of his plans were 
extravagant and unfeasible, like the occupation of Gallipoli, but the fact that 
he had possibilities planned, showed how much he distrusted Russia.89  At 
this point in the war, Disraeli was able to convince the Cabinet to agree to 
war with Russia if the Russians actually occupied Constantinople and the 
84 Seton-Watson, 122. 
85 Thompson, 517-518. 
86 Feuchtwanger, 188. 
87 Stavrianos, 406-407. 
88 Feuchtwanger, 187-188. 
89 Blake, 612-613. 
TENOR OF OUR TIMES  Spring 2016 
32 
Straits.90  The Russians finally took Plevna in December 1877 and continued 
their advance.   
In January of 1878, the British Cabinet voted to send the British fleet 
through the Dardanelles and asked Parliament for six million pounds to spend 
on a potential war.91  On January 23, the British fleet sailed to 
Constantinople.92  The Great Game author Peter Hopkirk summed it up 
eloquently when he wrote, “…in February 1878, the Russian armies stood at 
the gates of Constantinople, their age-old dream seemingly about to be 
realized, only to find the British Mediterranean fleet anchored in the 
Dardanelles.  It was a blunt warning to the Russians to proceed no further.  
War now seemed certain.”93  As an additional warning, Disraeli ordered that 
British Indian troops be moved towards the Mediterranean area, specifically 
Malta.  Britain was trying to make it clear to the Russians that they would 
defend their interests in the Mediterranean with force.94  Thankfully it did not 
come to that.  In fact, there were no hostile encounters between Russia and 
Britain because the Russians stopped their advance just outside 
Constantinople.   
Tsar Alexander backed down with his army two days away from 
Constantinople.  The threat of war with Britain was reason enough for Tsar 
Alexander to stop his advance.  Instead of continuing on to Constantinople, 
he made a truce with Turkey called the Treaty of San Stefano.95  The Treaty 
called for the independence of Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania, and 
established Bulgaria as an autonomous principality.  In addition, the Russians 
required a re-working of many of the borders of the Balkan states in order to 
get huge pieces of land in Anatolia.96  Everything about the new Bulgaria was 
to be Russianized even though the Ottomans still nominally controlled it.  
The Treaty called for Russian oversight of every aspect of the government.
97
  
It was wholly unacceptable to every power, particularly to Britain and the 
Ottomans.  Britain was afraid that Russian control of the Anatolian territory 
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gained from the Treaty would allow them easy access to the Mediterranean, 
which in turn would allow easy access to India.98  Even more than that, the 
treaty gave Russia considerable power over the Ottomans with the potential 
for increase over time.  Disraeli made his opinion on the Treaty clear in a 
speech to the House of Lords: 
It is to the subjugation of Turkey, it is against an 
arrangement, which practically would place at the 
command of Russia, and Russia alone, that unrivalled 
situation and its resources, which the European Powers 
places under the government of the Porte, that we protest.99 
Diplomats on every side suggested a congress in order to revise the Treaty of 
San Stefano more favorably.  The hope was that a congress could fix the 
problems and tension without Russia and Britain going to war.  Russia was 
reluctant to agree to a congress but eventually relented. 
Before the Congress met, Britain made two secret agreements.  
Russia and Britain forged the first agreement.  Lord Salisbury, who was now 
the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Count Shuvalov, an 
influential Russian statesman, negotiated the agreement.100  It outlined the 
concessions and reservations that the two countries would voice at the main 
Congress and gave a solution to most of them.  The main points included a 
division of Bulgaria into two different sections with two different 
governments.  Britain also insisted on dramatically changing the borders laid 
out in the San Stefano Treaty with the specific purpose of keeping Russia 
from having access to the Aegean Sea.101  Unfortunately for Britain, they had 
to allow the Russians to keep some territory gained in the Asian part of the 
Ottoman Empire, namely Kars and Batoum.
102
  Tsar Alexander assured the 
British that they would not extend their territory any farther.  No one in 
Britain put much stock in such a promise, but there was not much more that 
could be done.  The agreement was signed on May 30, 1878. 
The second agreement Britain conducted prior to the Congress was 
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the Cyprus Convention with the Ottomans.  The document was very short.  It 
addressed the threat posed by Russia if she gained Batoum, Ardahan, or Kars 
in the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire and promised Britain to defend 
against any Russian advance past those territories.  “In order to enable 
England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement,” the 
Sultan agreed to give the island of Cyprus to Britain.103  Biographer George 
Buckle believed that Disraeli himself chose Cyprus as the location but not 
without good reason.  The island was perfectly situated in the Mediterranean 
to defend both the Persian Gulf and the Suez.104  Commitment to stopping 
Russian aggression in the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire was a step for 
Britain, but it was also completely consistent with the direction of Disraeli’s 
policy since he became Prime Minister.  The promise of British intervention 
contained Russia and minimized the threat to India from yet another 
direction.  Almost as a side note, British control of Cyprus meant freedom for 
the Christians there, as well as a better position to enforce reforms for 
Christians all over the Ottoman Empire.105   
Scholars disagree over the effect that the secret preliminary 
agreements had on the effectiveness of the Congress.  According to one 
source, the agreements locked Britain into certain concessions that hindered 
Disraeli and Lord Salisbury at the Congress.106  Authors Monypenny and 
Buckle asserted that it was necessary to reach an agreement beforehand so 
that there was not an intractable conflict at the Congress with potentially 
disastrous results.107  In the moment, meeting with Russia beforehand was the 
correct move to make.  Armed with promises of concessions, both sides met, 
along with all the other major European powers, at the Congress of Berlin. 
The Congress of Berlin opened on June 13, 1878 and lasted for 
exactly one month to “decide the fate and future of Eastern Europe.”108  
Attending the Berlin Congress were three diplomats each from Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, as well as a few 
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representatives from Turkey.109  Out of all the delegates at the Berlin 
Congress, Disraeli caused the greatest stir and excitement among Berliners 
and the press.  He interested Berliners, particularly, because he actually 
traveled to Berlin himself as Prime Minister to be a part of the deliberations.  
The Times reported on June 13, “Lord Beaconsfield is the centre of attraction.  
His personal qualities, his past career, and his personal successes equally 
commanded the interest of the public.”110  The official object of the Congress 
was “to submit the work of San Stefano to the free discussion of the 
signatories of the Treaties of 1865 and 1871.”111  As President of the 
Congress, Bismarck had the authority to decide the order of deliberation.  He 
recognized that the sharpest point of contention and the one that involved the 
majority of the powers was the division of Bulgaria.112  In fact, the primary 
difference between the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin was the 
makeup of Bulgaria.113   
The preliminary agreement between Russia and Britain addressed 
Bulgaria and called for the division of Bulgaria into two parts, but the two 
countries still disagreed over Britain’s desire for the Ottomans to have 
military control of the southern half.114  The Berlin Congress deliberated 
heavily over this specific issue because the Russians were unwilling to give 
in.  Finally, Disraeli declared Britain’s proposal for the status of the southern 
province to be an ultimatum.  He threatened to break up the Congress and 
even had his secretary, Montagu Corry, look into getting train tickets back to 
London for the very next day.  Thankfully, Bismarck caught wind of 
Disraeli’s plans to leave and convinced him to stay.  Behind the scenes, 
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Bismarck convinced the Russians of the British sincerity and intractability on 
this point.  The next day Disraeli was pleasantly surprised to learn Russia’s 
acquiescence.115  There were a few minor details of the Bulgarian question 
left, but they were settled fairly quickly.  
Bulgaria was ultimately divided into three parts.  The first was 
Bulgaria proper, which would be an autonomous principality.  All the 
powers, including Britain, accepted that this part would be heavily influenced 
by Russia.  The second portion became Eastern Roumelia, which was to be 
governed by a Christian governor and was semi-autonomous.  The third and 
final portion included the Macedonian lands retained by Turkey.116  Disraeli 
told Lady Chesterfield of the Bulgarian question that Britain “gained a great 
victory here, the extent of which is hardly yet understood in England…”117  
Disraeli won the major battle of the Congress of Berlin. 
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The next major issue involved Austria-Hungary.  The Austro-
Hungarians wanted to claim Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of their territory.  
The British backed Count Andrassy’s proposal because he had been on 
Britain’s side during the Bulgarian incident.118  In fact, no one particularly 
opposed this point, though Russia agreed only reluctantly.119  Other major 
issues included disagreements over the borderline of Russia’s Asiatic frontier. 
The main problem was a misunderstanding between Disraeli and the Russian 
Count Gorchakov over what border line they were trying to move.  Once the 
other diplomats with them discovered the misunderstanding, they were 
quickly able to come to a compromise over where the line should be.120  The 
final issue was that of Batum.  Disraeli planned to argue strongly against 
Russian claims to it at the Congress.  However, the details of the Cyprus 
Convention leaked right at the moment that Batum was being discussed.  It 
was embarrassing for the British and made it hard for Disraeli or Lord 
Salisbury to ask for any concessions regarding Batum.  They were only able 
to secure Batum as a free port rather than completely block the Russians from 
taking that area.  Disraeli was right to worry about Russia in Batum because 
eight years later, Batum became a fortified Russian base as Russians claimed 
that the wording was vague.121  Even so, Britain made the correct move for 
the security of their colonies in obtaining Cyprus.  Once the Congress knew 
all of the details, most of the diplomats praised Disraeli and Lord Salisbury 
for such a “daring stroke.”122 
The Treaty of Berlin was signed on July 13, 1878.  At the time, most 
people deemed it a major success, particularly for Disraeli and Britain.  The 
German Crown Princess, Victoria, wrote to her mother Queen Victoria on the 
day it was signed to share that she thought that Britain’s prestige on the 
continent was finally restored.  The Russians had been checked and put in 
their place.123  Disraeli and Lord Salisbury returned home to London to an 
enthusiastic public.124  Disraeli had conquered the Eastern Question.  If 
nothing else, he accomplished his own goals for Britain.  Disraeli’s own 
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popularity and participation in the Congress turned all eyes towards Britain.  
Though Bismarck presided over the Berlin Congress and directed the general 
discussion, the entire Congress had been dominated by British goals and 
fears.  In that regard, Disraeli reminded the other powers that Britain still had 
a strong, if not the strongest, say in continental and world affairs.  Russian 
threats and advances towards India were sufficiently checked for the time 
being.  Issues in Afghanistan continued to flare up, but Disraeli stopped the 
Russian advance he had feared from their conflict with Turkey and the San 
Stefano Treaty.  While Russia gained some territory, the Treaty of Berlin 
made certain that there was not enough for her to threaten the Ottomans or 
Britain.  Finally, the Congress of Berlin succeeded in breaking up the 
dreikaiserbund.  Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany did not agree with 
each other enough by the end of the Congress and Eastern crisis as a whole to 
justify a continued joint policy.125  They based their alliance largely on the 
problem in the Balkans, and now that the problem was “fixed” there was no 
longer a need for an alliance. 
For more than 500 years, Europe dealt with the problem of the 
Eastern Question.  The Question became especially troublesome in the 19th 
century, causing several crises.  As Prime Minister in the 1870s, Benjamin 
Disraeli dealt with a great crisis that was exacerbated by the deterioration of 
the Ottoman Empire, Russia’s territorial advances in the Balkans and Central 
Asia, as well as an alliance between Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany.  
Disraeli successfully pursued a policy that contained the Russian threat to 
India and restored Britain’s power and prestige on the European Continent.
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